REGULATION OF UNION SECURITY CONTRACTS"
THE main purpose of a union security agreement is to increase the union's bargaining power.' With greater control over dissident members, and with the employer tied to a union-dominated labor market, the secured union can more forcefully press its demands for better working conditions.
2 But the monopoly power conferred by such agreements has at times been seriously abused.
3 Racial discrimination, arbitrary denial of membership to qualified *Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) . 1. In 1946 over 75% of the fifteen million employees working under union agreements were covered by some form of union security. Of this number half were under closed and union shop agreements. 68 MONTHLY LABoR REvImv 143 (1949) .
Labor has long argued for the union shop (the term is used by unions to signify both closed shop aid union shop, see note 2 infra) as the logical extension of collective bargaining. TONER, THE CLOSED SaoP 6 (1942) . For an analysis of the arguments advanced by labor and management for and against union security see Douglas, A Possible REV. 127, 136-41 (1943) .
For a full discussion of other devices used to achieve security and their economic results see SLICHTEI, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, CC. II, III, IV (1941) .
2. A union security agreement compels individual employees to join a union or refrain from leaving a union as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. These agreements are classified according to the point in the employment relation at which this compulsion begins. The dosed shop requires union membership as a condition of obtaining employment, the union shop requires membership within a specified period after hiring as a condition of retaining employment, and the maintenance of membership agreement requires those who have once joined to refrain from leaving the union as a condition of retaining employment. Preferential hiring involves offering union members the first crack at job openings. A device to facilitate union financing, the check-off involves employer deduction of dues from pay and lump-sum payment to the union. For discussion of the types of security agreements and their evolution see TELLER, A LABoR GEo. LJ. 198,201-2 (1948) .
There has been much confusion of the labels "closed shop with closed union," "closed shop with open union," and "union shop." Because of the prejudicial connotations of "closed shop," management tends to refer to all three types as closed shops. Conversely, unions prefer the term "union shop" for all three situations. By discarding these much confused labels and spelling out the conditions under which a security agreement is permissible, the drafters of § 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947) , 29 U.S.C. § § 141-97 (Supp. 1949) , avoided these semantic difficulties.
3. Flagrant abuses of the secured position have included limiting the number of employees eligible for membership, restricting membership to relatives of present members, cutting down the number of apprentices, charging exorbitant initiation fees, expelling members for personal reasons, disregarding rights of minority members, and using official position for personal gain. 449 (1935) , 29 U.S.C. § § 151-66 (1946). 14. While the proviso of § 8(3) of the Act permitted discharge of employees pursuant to a security clause without such action constituting an unfair labor practice, Congress denied an intent to sanction the closed shop, to impose it on all industry, or to legalize it in a state where it was against public policy. SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1147 , 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935 . The Supreme Court has interpreted the proviso as merely disclaiming a national policy hostile to the closed shop. Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 307 (1949) . See also 93 CONG. Rac. 6519-20 (1947 The Wisconsin Board had ordered the Algoma Company, which was engaged in interstate commerce, to reinstate an employee discharged in accordance with a maintenance of membership agreement. The Board declared the security contract invalid unless approved by two-thirds of the workers as required by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Act.P Both employer and union protested that the Taft-Hartley Act suspended the Wisconsin Act for businesses engaged in interstate commerce; and that the security contract was valid because a majority of the workers had voted in favor of the agree- 
18.
Modifying the proviso of § 8(3) of the N.L.R.A., § 8(a) (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act allows only those compulsory membership agreements which are approved by a majority of the employees affected and which allow the lapse of a thirty day period after hiring before the new employee must join the union. 198, 211-12 (1948 25 the immediate effect of the decision is limited; but in the field of union abuse of its monopoly position the implications of the decision are large. Under the Algonia decision state regulation can now invalidate security agreements of a union even though the employer is engaged solely in interstate commerce and the agreements are made in strict compliance with federal law.
While this decision opens the way for constructive state legislation, prior history gives little indication that the opportunity will be realized. Whether motivated by an estimable desire to further the interest of prospective employees, or merely by the desire to cripple unions, state regulation has overlooked the different functions performed by security agreements in different industries. In short-term skilled occupations such as the building trades, and inshort-term unskilled occupations such as stevedoring, the closed shop with union hiring serves both employer and employee.
2 0 In relatively permanent, mass production employment, union hiring is unfeasible and unions have sought security agreements only to enhance their bargaining power.
21 Ignoring these differences and overlooking the very real contribution union security has made to industrial peace 28 and union responsibility in some in- In stevedoring and maritime occupations, employer sanction of the union hiring hall is not unanimous but their prime interest is in obtaining employees. The individual has a great interest here in a system for equitably spreading the work. And even here there has been employer action for preserving the features of the hiring hall. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1949, p. 45, col. 2. 27. The strong employer protest against the closed shop has come from these mass production industries. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1949, p. 1, col. 5. But in these industries unions have shown little desire to control hiring, being interested only in such security provisions as the union shop. (Before Taft-Hartley there was only one CIO union wvith a closed shop agreement.) So insistent has been the opposition to union hiring by the mass production industries that these industries have often managed to identify their interests with the interests of all industries--even those in which opposition to union hiring would normally be minimal or non-existent.
28. Peaceful collective bargaining has resulted from long standing security provisions in such trades as clothing, building and printing. See remarks of Senator Cape-[Vol. $9 dustries, states have bracketed together and outlawed as "monopolistic" all types of union security without any attempt to attack particular evils.-3 This all-or-nothing regulation has disrupted industrial stability and led to uncertainty in collective bargaining relations. 0 Failure to distinguish between the institution of union security and union abuse of its secured position has influenced adoption of these arbitrary state policies. Most opposition directed at union security has arisen because of undemocratic union practices and membership discrimination following adoption of a security agreement.
1
Lopping off the foot to save the toe, states often have attempted to regulate these post-security contract abuses by abolishing security contracts.
3 2 Moreover, even these drastic measures often fail to correct the abuse, since most unions strong enough to engage in abusive practices are able to do so even without a security agreement. We did so, among other reasons, because we know that the closed shop worked well in our plant and had worked well for a half century or more. (1947) . 30. Operation of the Taft-Hartley ban on the closed shop illustrates the disrupting effect of "all-or-nothing" legislation. Before the Act, for example, the history of the International Typographical Union was a record of nearly a century of bargaining without serious dispute, constant gains for its members, and increasing public confidence. But since the Act's passage the ITU has strenuously resisted the attack on its security.
Long strikes and extensive litigation have already cost the union $11,000,000. Despite this alarming cost to both the union and the public the Act has completely failed to eliminate the union's abuses and to protect the public interest in establishment of nondiscriminatory admission policies. SN. Rm. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1949) .
31. See the remarks of the Taft-Hartley "watchdog" committee: "If there is to be a dosed shop (union hiring), then we can hardly permit a closed union." SEzr. REP. No. 99, Part 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1949) . See also TEL.ER, A LAror PoLicy roa Ama cA 138 (1945) .
32.
State bans on the closed shop have hit hardest in occupations 'where union hiring is most important to employer and employee. The public interest in these occupations centers not on who controls hiring but rather on ensuring that qualified individuals are admitted to the union. Rather than outlaw union hiring-which is useful-rational legislation would best serve this public interest by keeping the union "open" to new members. 
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The national policy favoring collective bargaining and guarafiteeing the right of organization 84 becomes meaningless if states are left free to impose arbitrary restrictions on collective bargaining. Industrial peace, the goal of national legislation in the labor-management field, is best achieved by leaving union and management free to come to whatever security agreement they will, provided only that the union represents a majority of the employees.
13
This free collective bargaining policy would require uniform national legislation forbidding state invalidation of bargained-for security contracts. Legislation of this kind would protect established national labor policy; and, because Congress would then have preempted regulation of security contracts as such, state efforts would be necessarily directed toward proscription of post-security abuses. 36 Ideal state regulation would prohibit discriminatory admission and exclusion practices in secured unions. Without destroying the effectiveness of union leadership, these regulatory measures shoyld ensure that all qualified applicants are admitted to the union. This could be achieved by forbidding discharge of an employee for non-membership in a secured union-except for bona fide occupational disqualification or the administration of disciplineand by giving all discharged employees an appeal to a labor relations board for a determination of the legality of the suspension or expulsion. The Wagner Act took selection of the collective bargaining representative out of the realm of bargaining and it has been proposed that union security likewise be made automatic on approval of a sufficient majority of the employees. For a suggestion that a union shop be automatically imposed when approved by a majority of the employees, see Douglas, A Possible Method of Dealing with the Closed Shop Issue, 14 U. ov Cur.-L. R-v. 386, 390-91 (1947) . A similar suggestion, requiring a three-fourths majority, has been made by Senator Malone. 93 CONG. REc. 4876 (1947) . 1, 36. Present national regulation fails to prevent abuse of the secured position. While parts of the Taft-Hartley Act seem to be worded so as to proscribe discriminatory admission, exclusion, and expulsion practices by unions, that result has not been achieved. Sde Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-i, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425, 449 (1949) . Effective national regulation of these abuses would require a statutory mechanism similar to that employed under state fair employment acts. Note 8 supra. But the already demonstrated tenor of congressional minority bloc feeling makes adequate national legislation in the near future unlikely. During the first session of the Eighty-first Congress thirteen such-bills were introduced. House bill No. 4453 was reported lty cdmmittee in August but no action taken. Senate bill "No. 1728 was reported without recommendation in October but no action taken. In view of congressional apathy, the task of eliminating post-security abuses may devolve entirely upon the states.
-37: This is essentially'tie provision of the Massachusetts'Labor Relations Law, MASS, ANN. LAws c.'150a,- § 4(6) and § 6A (Supp. 1948) . If the employee has exhausted all his
